Remembering Reykjavik

by: Clyde   posted: 2009-01-09 11:47:00
Viewed 303 times. 3 Comments.

Bambi's view of no torture - yet talking with torturers - is dangerously naive. Let's revisit his views on defense from a campaign commercial:

He'll negotiate with Russia? Glad. We always should be talking. But if he applies his naivete in other areas to discussion with Putin, he (and us) will be toast.

Instead of reading so much about FDR and Lincoln, Bambi would do well to recall the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik. So as not to seem too biased, let's go to the Old Grey Prostitute's account of the summit.

Here the discussion are in a nutshell:

After consultation with aides, Mr. Reagan proposed a 10-year guaranteed adherence, two and a half years more than he originally suggested. Under the new plan, the two sides would cut their strategic offensive forces by 50 percent over the first five years, with total elimination of all nuclear ballistic missiles after 10 years.

But the Soviet Union insisted on a change in the ABM treaty to ban all but ''laboratory'' research, testing and development.

Mr. Gorbachev, according to American officials, asked why there was a need for a missile defense system if all ballistic missiles were to be elimited within 10 years.

Mr. Reagan is said to have replied, ''For insurance,'' and made the point that if there were no missiles, the defense program, too, could be curtailed. But this did not satisfy Mr. Gorbachev, the Americans said.

Remember Reagan's words: Trust but verify. Here, he assures us that while he will commit to the decreases in the nuclear arsenal, he will maintain insurance in the event the USSR reneged.

Let's put aside the child's version of this important summit. Let's go deep: Here's an annotated chronology to steep you in the details.

For more details (including links to many source docs) on the Summit, let's go to an article from George Washington University, written based upon documents released in 2006. The set up:

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev almost achieved a deal 20 years ago at the 1986 Reykjavik summit to abolish nuclear weapons, but the agreement would have required "an exceptional level of trust" that neither side had yet developed.

When discussions began for a "quick meeting," Reagan - never one to miss an opportunity - demanded and received something in return:

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reports to the Politburo on his talks in Washington and informs the Soviet leadership about Reagan's decision to accept Gorbachev's invitation to meet in Reykjavik on the condition that 25 Soviet dissidents including Yury Orlov and Nicholas Daniloff, accused of spying, are released. Gorbachev accepts the conditions and sets forth his main ideas for the summit.

The basis for the meeting seemed to have evolved on on the ground:

The documents show that U.S. analysis of Gorbachev's goals for the summit completely missed the Soviet leader's emphasis on "liquidation" of nuclear weapons, a dream Gorbachev shared with Reagan and which the two leaders turned to repeatedly during the intense discussions at Reykjavik in October 1986.

This pre-meeting basis is further noted here:

This briefing memo from Shultz to Reagan, labeled "Super Sensitive" as well as formally classified as "Secret/Sensitive," shows that the U.S. did not expect any actual agreement at Reykjavik, but rather, mere preparations for a future summit in the U.S. Shultz talks here about ceilings on ballistic missiles but fails to predict Gorbachev's dramatic agreements to 50% cuts and a process leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Ironically, Shultz says one of the U.S. goals is to emphasize progress "without permitting the impression that Reykjavik itself was a Summit," when history now sees Reykjavik as in many ways the most dramatic summit meeting of the Cold War.

Some fascinating reading is here - the US version of first day discussions between Reagan and Gorbachev and the USSR version of those same discussions.

Even more compelling reading is here - the US version of the last meetings, and the Russian version.

Quoting the article:

For Gorbachev, SDI was a U.S. attempt to take the arms race into space and potentially launch a first-strike attack on the Soviet Union - the ultimate nightmare for Soviet leaders seared into their consciousnesses by Hitler's blitzkrieg. But Gorbachev's scientists had already told him that missile defenses could be easily and cheaply countered with multiple warheads and decoys even if the defenses ever worked (which was unlikely).

The great "what if" question suggested by the Reykjavik transcripts is what would have happened if Gorbachev had simply accepted Reagan's apparently sincere offer to share SDI technology rather than dismissing this as ridiculous when the U.S. would not even share "milking machines." If Gorbachev had "pocketed" Reagan's offer, then the pressure would have been on the U.S. to deliver, in the face of a probable firestorm of opposition from the U.S. military and foreign policy establishment. Working in the opposite direction in favor of the deal would have been overwhelming public support for these dramatic changes, both in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union, and especially in Europe.

Perhaps most evocative is the Russian version's closing words, which are not included in the U.S. transcript. This exchange comes after Reagan asks for a personal "favor" from Gorbachev of accepting the offer on SDI and ABM, and Gorbachev replies by saying this is not a favor but a matter of principle. The U.S. version has Reagan standing at that point to leave the room and a brief polite exchange about regards to Nancy Reagan. But the Russian version has Reagan saying, "I think you didn't want to achieve an agreement anyway" and "I don't know when we'll ever have another chance like this and whether we will meet soon."

Many more docs on at the GWU article link. Enjoy delving into them.

But let's cut to the chase scene: Why was Gorbachev so insistent on ending the SDI program? Even if he was going to work with it towards the end of the discussions - then bailed - it is because SDI would obviate the Mutually Assured Destruction doctrine. If successful (and we are largely there now), the threat of incoming missiles would end. The USSR could not compete with our investment in research and deployment, so they had to try to stop it. Reagan did not let that occur.

The battle continues with our discussion with Poland and other Eastern European countries on placing missile shields.

How will Bambi handle USSR v2.0 under Putin? Let's hope with more intelligence and prudence than his campaign rhetoric suggested.

Tags: Reagan, gorbachev, nuclear, 

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